The commons and emergent land in Kvarken Archipelago, Finland: governing an expanding recreational resource

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In this article, we explore governance structures of the recreational landscape of Kvarken Archipelago in Western Finland, an area where shore displacement occurs due to land rise and emergent (pristine) land is continuously created. Traditionally a production landscape, of fishing and small-scale agriculture, the recreational value of the archipelago has been acknowledged. The area is a popular second home destination and was designated UNESCO World Heritage in 2006. There are roughly 10,000 second homes within the study area, of which 14% are leaseholds located on emergent land. The emergent land thus makes up a common-pool resource system where private and collective use rights overlap. This article aims to understand the implications for recreational use (second home ownership) through interviews with different local stakeholders such as municipality planners, representatives of commons, local communities, and with environmental and land survey authorities. Especially, it sets out to ask, what kinds of value are created within the recreational resource system, what power relationships within the commons steer the management of the recreational resource system, and what are the implications for recreational use of the landscape. The results show different logics of recreational resource management locally in the studied commons. Access to second homes located within the collectively owned emergent land is limited to part-owners of the commons and tend to be less commercialized and also less modernized than privately owned second home plots.

Keywords: commons, emergent land, recreational resource system, re-resourcing, post-productive landscape, second homes

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Introduction

At the narrowest part of the Gulf of Bothnia between Sweden and Finland, scattered islands and skerries form a shallow archipelago off the coast of Ostrobothnia County in Finland. Originating from glacial pressures during the latest Ice Age, the land rises continuously within this area creating large zones of emergent land, which is the reason for the area’s designation as UNESCO World Heritage (WH) Kvarken Archipelago in 2006 (UNESCO 2006; Svels 2011a). Emergent land, also called accretion
area, is the visible result of land elevation as former water areas are converted to solid land. The elevation rate within the study area is approximately 8–9 mm/year which due to the shallow sea level results in an annual land growth of roughly 1 km² (Jones 1977; Svels 2017). Visible traces of the land elevation are the natural creation of skerries and shifting shorelines, which causes the need for dredging waterways and moving harbors and berths outwards to the sea (Jones 1969; Bonn 1997).

The emerging land areas constitute a growing resource for the local communities. Since the Great Partition in the mid-18th century, the water areas including all emergent land have been collectively owned by local village commons (Jones 1987). The recreational value in the archipelago was generally realized with the boom in second home construction, which occurred during the 1960s and 1970s when new second homes were primarily purpose-built rather than converted from other types of dwellings (Jansson & Müller 2003). Emergent land, instead of being considered rather worthless, became a valuable resource as demand increased. Kvarken Archipelago is today an attractive second home area with approximately 10,000 second homes (Svels 2011a). The greater part of second home plots is privately owned; however, the municipality planners estimate that about 14% of the stock are built on leasehold plots owned by the commons.

In this article, we focus on the implications of commons as a management structure for the recreational landscape, and on the use of second homes in the area. Kvarken Archipelago makes up a complex multiple-unit and multiple-user resource system (Edwards & Steins 1999), attractive for a variety of users. In the archipelago, originally constituting a low-value agricultural and fishery resource (Rautio & Ilvessalo 1998), the commons are today able to draw a significant revenue stream from the recreational value, mainly through the leasing of second home plots. The second home owners have different opportunities to participate in decision-making regarding the resource system, depending on their ownership shares in the commons. As old traditions of common land use for hunting, fishing and agriculture encounter modern phenomena, such as second home tourism, the present governance structures are being challenged. As large local landowners, the commons have become important stakeholders in the local societies, able to control revenue from and access to emergent land. The aim of the article is to examine the operational structure of the Kvarken Archipelago commons concerning the expanding land resource, in order to build an understanding about their role as managers and controllers of the resource system. The research questions are the following: 1) what kinds of value are created within the recreational resource system?, 2) what power relationships within the commons steer the management of the recreational resource system?, and 3) what are the implications for recreational use of the landscape?

To answer the first question, we describe how the commons have developed in the local context of a growing resource system and changing resource value recognition. The second question considers the collective-choice level of commons management and will elaborate on their differing dividend logics and how the value is realized and managed in the local society. The third question focuses on how power relationships affect the use of the resource system and subsequent implications for the recreational landscape.

In the next section, we present the study area and the development of the archipelago from a low-value agricultural landscape to a valuable recreational resource system, followed by a discussion on the theoretical concepts of resource systems and common-pool property regimes. Next, we explain the research methods, based on 17 semi-structured interviews with representatives of the commons, spatial planners, land survey representatives, environmental authorities and second home owners. The results then describe five commons in Kvarken Archipelago, the recreational value of the landscape, the commons' role in society and the distribution of power within the studied commons. Finally, we discuss the implications for the recreational landscape, finalized by our main conclusions.

Kvarken Archipelago - from production landscape to recreational resource

The area constituting the Kvarken Archipelago at present day, was inhabited during the 11th century and was until the early 20th century dominated by traditional economic activities including fishing, hunting (seal), small-scale farming and forestry, trade and seafaring (Rautio & Ilvessalo 1998). The
value of the archipelago land resources was long considered less important than the mainland resources. However, during the 20th century an increase in the provision of new, non-traditional, rural goods and services, including tourism and second homes, diversified the local economy (Svels 2011b). Multifunctional landscapes where traditional modes of production have gradually shifted toward a focus on (recreational) amenities, economic diversification and environmental and cultural preservation have been described as ‘post-productive’ landscapes (McCarthy 2005; Woods 2011; Almstedt et al. 2014).

This development is understood as ‘re-resourcing’ where the resource system’s value realisation moves from production value to aesthetic value (Perkins 2006; Overvåg 2010), that is from the extraction of natural resources to the recreational use of the landscape, such as viewing, hiking, and second home living. Such activities have become increasingly commodified with the growth of tourism as a business (Perkins 2006). This means that two types of value can be created in recreational resource systems: use value created for users (recreationists) from either free or commercialized recreation, and exchange value for producers. In the post-productive landscape of Kvarken Archipelago, new (high yield) exchange value of the resource is realized that was earlier low yield production value. This is driven by demand from recreationists (tourists and second home owners) and by producers (landowners/the commons) realizing a profit from the exchange value.

In order to understand the importance of the growing recreational resource system in the local area, and the commons’ role in managing it, we frame this research from two points of departure. The first point is to understand the complexity of multiple-user/multiple-unit resource systems. In complex resource systems, multiple property regimes overlap, controlling users’ access and rights to resource units. Furthermore, in such systems the rather fluid use of recreational resource units by temporary user groups adds to this complexity. The second point of departure relates to the management structure of the commons, and to their role as the local institutions of land use governance. The commons’ management structure relates to their role as locally embedded institutions, and as the organizations of collective action in the management of local resources.

Complex resource systems

Natural and built resources, for example land and water areas, game populations, production forests, roads, wells and irrigation constructions, are increasingly understood as existing within social-ecological (resource) systems (Ostrom 2009). Resource systems are multi-layered, or mixed, as they comprise a variety of resource units (e.g. fish stocks, second home plots, waterways and viewing points), ownership types (private land owners, commons, municipalities) and users (commercial fishers, second home owners, visiting recreationists) (Ostrom 1999; Fennell 2011). The access and use rights of resources can be formal or informal and are controlled in property rights regimes (Edwards & Steins 1999).

An efficient property rights regime has three basic characteristics: 1) exclusivity (costs and benefits related to ownership accrues to the owner), 2) transferability (freedom of exchange of property rights), and 3) enforceability (security from encroachment or seizure by non-owners). Four general classes of resource units to which property rights are bound within a resource system are defined by Carlsson (2008): 1) open access resources which are freely accessible for many users, 2) public or state resources where access is controlled by government bodies, 3) private resources where access is strictly exclusive, and 4) common-pool resources where access is shared within an exclusive group of users. Within these classes exist also toll resource units where access is controlled through fees, for example entrance fees or lease agreements.

Most natural resource systems, such as complex systems of archipelagos, rivers or forests that contain several or all of the resource classes, are used by multiple user groups for extractive and/or non-extractive purposes, and are managed under a mixture of property regimes (Edwards & Steins 1999). Naturally, the range of users or user groups perform varying degrees of interaction and influence over the economic and social coordination, management and governing of property and use rights in a complex resource system. Therefore, a crucial resource management issue is balancing multiple interests.
Even though the majority of research on resource systems consider regimes, where the main resource value is productive or for means of sustenance, such as timber extraction or water irrigation, almost all natural resource systems hold some level of recreational value. Recreational resource systems are often mixed, meaning that several property regimes exist, and therefore external users (e.g., recreationists) may enter the resource system and utilize a wide variety of natural, sociocultural or built resource units. In the Scandinavian countries, recreation is generally an open access resource, freely accessible for the public. The tourism sector relies on the collective control of the natural resource units while exploiting the tourism revenue stream privately (Healy 1994; Sandell & Fredman 2010), through services and access to built resources or lease agreements. There are thus different producers and management systems involved in controlling the use and protection of recreational resource units (Briassoulis 2002). External users may interfere with existing use rules, and they also influence the value recognition of resources. The commons play a significant role in sustainable tourism development, for example by stipulating environmental and moral ethics to delimit the overuse of resources (Kaltenborn et al. 2001; Holden 2005).

**Common-pool property regimes**

Common-pool property regimes (also referred to as the commons) represent a distinct form of resource governance as property and use rights are shared among a group of part-owners which can comprise physical or juridical persons (such as government and non-government organizations) with varying entitlements and decision-making power. Common-pool resources are subtractable or rivalrous in their consumption, and excluding users is costly (McKean 2000). Rules relating to the exclusivity, transferability and enforceability of the resource units are stipulated through either formal (juridical) or informal (traditional or customary) law. The commons’ management functions are in most aspects significantly self-organized and autonomous (Ostrom 1990; Hysing 2009). However, it has been noted that the state still holds a significant steering role through the legislation on management of the commons (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994; Holmgren et al. 2010; Lidestav et al. 2013).

Ostrom (1990) has identified three levels of management within commons: 1) the legislative or constitutional level regulated by the state, 2) the collective-choice level controlled through the commons’ stipulated by-laws or statutes, and 3) the operational level where decided rules and control functions are implemented. The commons are per definition collaborative institutions, however, due to overlapping property regimes and diverse part-owner communities, collective action situations are not always frictionless (Edwards & Steins 1999; Sandström et al. 2013). Collective action is encouraged through a group’s shared interests, and influenced by the size and productivity of the resource system (Ostrom 2009), for example realized value, scarcity and accessibility of the resource units, and social and human capital within the part-owner community (Lidestav et al. 2017). It is delimited by, for instance, the alienation of certain user groups, locked power relations and conflict situations (Heinmiller 2009; Sandström et al. 2013).

As revenue may be created through the extraction or external consumption of resource units, the management problem of the commons is thus not only to sustain and protect the resources but also to manage and distribute profits fairly to the part-owner community (McKean 2000; Lidestav et al. 2013). It has been noted that, especially when it comes to complex natural resource systems, the commons’ goals are sometimes not only to contribute to the welfare of their own part-owner community but to participate in local development more broadly (Lidestav et al. 2013, 2017). A challenge is therefore to adapt the commons’ functions and regulatory framework to changing circumstances (Dietz et al. 2003). One of the problems is path dependency, where assets are locked up and power distribution concentrated, due to for example vested interests of certain part-owners, especially if combined with a strong hierarchy or concentration of power.

**Approaching the Kvarken Archipelago commons**

The study focuses geographically on five commons situated within the WH area: Sundom commons (city of Vaasa), Över- and Yttermalax commons (Malax municipality), Molpe village commons (Korsnäs
municipality), Björkö commons (Korsholm municipality) and Maxmo archipelago commons (Vörå municipality). They are historically connected with villages and fishery areas in the region, and together they own more than half of the water areas within the WH Kvarken Archipelago.

We used qualitative research methods in data collection and analysis. The data is collected through semi-structured interviews conducted between October 2014 and February 2015. We used a purposive sampling approach, identifying respondents by theoretical and snowball sampling techniques (Hennik et al. 2011). In total, 17 interviews were conducted. The aim was to obtain a holistic picture of land rise effects, resource management and use, overlapping property regimes and governance structures present in the area. Therefore, the interview cluster included not only representatives of the studied commons (5 interviews) but also municipality (5 interviews) and regional planners (1 interview), land survey and environmental authorities and associations (4 interviews) and second home leaseholders (2 interviews). The respondents chose to participate alone or together with colleagues or partners to combine their areas of expertise. Of the municipality planners three out of five participated as a group (2–5 people), likewise the regional planners and environmental authority (2–3 people). One common organization chose to be represented by the whole executive committee (5 people) and the others only by their chairman. One second home leaseholder participated alone, the other was joined during the interview by the spouse. Interviewing in groups can be risky if interviewees are uncomfortable to give their opinions openly within the group. On the other hand, interviewees can help each other to give fuller answers as they discuss issues together. During these interviews, we did not detect any discomfort between the participants in the group interviews, as the group formation was on their own initiative, and they all knew each other beforehand.

To understand in what ways the archipelago resource system, and the emergent land resource in particular, is used and managed, all respondents were asked questions regarding their perception of land rise effects, their interests in the resource system, and their perception of the commons’ role as local institutions. However, as the respondents represent different areas of expertise, specific sets of questions were asked. To the representatives of the commons queries covered their operational functions, management principles, revenue management and their perceptions of their own role in society. Municipality and regional planners, and environmental authorities and associations answered questions regarding shore planning, environmental effects of land rise and of resource use, strategic visions and the significance of the archipelago as a recreational landscape. The land survey representatives answered questions regarding land rise and property law, partitions and transfer of property rights, and mapping procedures in the archipelago. The second home owners answered questions regarding their access to emergent land and what use rights they enjoy, as well as questions regarding their decision-making power when it comes to the common-pool resource (Svels & Åkerlund 2018).

The interviews with planners and authorities can be described as expert interviews conducted to build an understanding about the legal and regulatory framework, whereas the interviews with representatives of the commons and second home owners are perception oriented and aim to build an understanding of the experiences and opinions of the stakeholders. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours, and have all been transcribed. In addition to the interviews, written documents have complemented the empirical material. This includes the constitutionalized statutes (by-laws) of all five commons, and the Law of the Commons (Finsk Författningssamling 1989).

The interview transcripts have been analyzed through a qualitative thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006), thus repeated patterns of meaning were sought within the interview data set. Thematic analysis is inherently flexible, and strongly characterized by the theoretical position within which it is situated. This makes the approach well suited for research aiming to contextualize the identified patterns within the data, while it also acknowledges the active role of the researcher in developing themes (Braun & Clarke 2006). Through several coding sequences, the raw interview data were classified into loose categories and subsequently developed into three main themes; 1) resource value recognition – how stakeholders perceived the resource system to be of material and symbolic value to them, and how it could be valued in monetary revenue, 2) operational and democratic structures of the commons institutions – including, among others, voting procedures, concentration of power and
human and social capital, and 3) the commons as significant local institutions – their role in *local resource management*.

**The Kvarken Archipelago commons – managers of local recreational resource**

After the Great Partition and subsequent redistributions of land in the 1920s, the water areas, including grazing meadows, shore areas and islets, remained in collective ownership and commons organizations were established (Fig. 1). Emergent land continuously accrues to the common-pool resource stock, increasing its size yearly in the Kvarken Archipelago.

The part-owner communities of the studied commons (Table 1) include juridical (e.g. municipalities and NGOs) and private persons. Part-ownership is based on the ownership of private land properties in the villages and scaled according to hide (in Swedish *mantal*): the old measure for taxation of land.

![Figure 1](image_url)

*Figure 1*. The World Heritage municipalities and the studied commons (Svels & Åkerlund 2018).
properties (Jones 1987). Shares are thus formally tied to the size of land parcels, and normally passed in inheritance to following generations. Membership can, technically, be acquired through purchasing a land property with tied shares. However, there is a reluctance to divest shares in this manner and they are now largely separated from the land properties. Individuals with no previous family connections to the village thus have very limited means of acquiring membership in the commons.

There was originally little state intervention into the ways the commons managed themselves and how they developed organically depending on local contextual factors, for example composition of part-owners, size of the resource system and means of livelihood. In 1940, the management of the commons were regulated in Finnish law, and subsequently developed into the Law of the Commons (Finsk Författningssamling 1989), which lays down general rules for decision-making, transfer of property rights, distribution of dividends and other management issues. The larger commons adopted statutes (by-laws) as stipulated in the law and became constitutionalized. A difference can be noticed regarding the official constitution of the commons. Malax, Björkö, Maxmo and Molpe are all fairly ‘new’ commons, registered according to the 1989 Law of the Commons whereas the statutes of Sundom commons are still based on the legal text from 1940.

Realizing the recreational value

The post-productivist era on the Finnish coast since the 1970s is characterized by the utilization of natural resources being determined by values, aspirations and powers related to leisure, tourism and nature conservation (Salmi 2018). The Kvarken Archipelago area begun to be commodified in the 1960s and 1970s when second home construction boomed, and the rural areas in immediate connection to the city of Vaasa started to experience a population increase. Acquiring second homes in the archipelago became popular among the urban and suburban population. However, as environmental preservation and shoreline protection measures have delimited the amount of building permits and land rise effects create the continuous need for dredging, demand has remained higher than supply. Second home plots in the more popular areas now have a relatively high exchange value. This means that exchange value is also realized as monetary profit for the commons, creating a significant revenue stream:

In a way we view it [the second home settlement] perhaps positively since the village lives up during the summer. A lot of people around and securing business and so on, that can be useful during the winter season. (Molpe commons’ representative)

Being able to fully acquire the land is highly desired by leaseholders, however second home plots are very rarely divested from the common-pool property regime:

Sometimes, in some divestment in the archipelago the land owner above the emergent land has been able to acquire it. But they [the commons] do not sell otherwise. Not happily I’d say. It’s their goldmine after all. (Second home owner, Sundom)

The main form of revenue realized for the part-owners of the commons arises through leasing contracts, and in a few instances state compensation for production losses in relation to the environmental protection programs and private land redemptions. Some commons also engage in offering recreational services, for example Malax commons own a number of purpose-built cottages in the archipelago, which are rented on short term contracts. In Björkö for some years, the commons

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<td>Total areal, ha</td>
<td>26,513</td>
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<td>Water areal</td>
<td>20,206</td>
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<td>Part-owners in common</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1,320</td>
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have been running tourism development projects on their premises, for example public parking spaces and an exhibition center. Thus, even though the number of second home lease plots are limited, the overall value of the resource system increases yearly.

**The commons’ role in local society**

Much previous research on commons regard the governance of limited extractive resource units, such as game populations or water irrigation systems, where a primary management issue is sustainability and delimiting overuse. In Kvarken Archipelago, the resource system is growing and the use value is primarily recreational. Therefore, management issues do not revolve around use rules, but rather preserving the recreational value, and distributing profits in the best interest of part-owners. As significant local resource management institutions, the commons’ dividends logics become of interest also for the wider community. According to statutes, revenue is to be used in the best interest for the commons and the part-owners. This is interpreted differently in the studied commons. Three logics are noted: for the best of 1) the community, 2) the resource system, and 3) the part-owners.

The first logic follows the idea that as the commons are constituted through the villages, the **best of the community** means the village and the local community. Molpe village commons is the most striking example in this respect. Dividends are used for the benefit of the village in a broad sense, for example to renovate road lighting, bicycle paths and village assembly halls, also where located outside of the common properties. The operation in its whole is inclusive, as benefits also consider non-owners.

It’s about traditions… commons are [...] a village community and you know that in old documents the commons is the village, that’s the way they have interpreted it [...] We have invested in the village. We have agreed on spending it on the community. (Molpe commons’ representative)

Also, Björköby commons adopt a village-perspective in their operation, although in Björkö shares have very rarely been divested, and most residents of the village are also part-owners.

To protect the village and to make sure the emerging land belongs to the people in Björkö, that has been an important thing. [...] The second home owners are mostly locals from Björkö village. [...] Well, yes, there are a few from outside the village but they still have a connection to Björkö and they have obtained the second home leases through inheritance. (Björköby commons’ representative)

A generally more applied logic, the second one, sees to the **best for the resource system itself**, and for preserving the recreational value of the resource system. This could include environmental protection measures such as keeping the archipelago clean. However, more often it has got to do with ensuring access to the archipelago for its users. Dividends are distributed to organizations and actors engaged with management or maintenance of the resource system, such as compensation to boat clubs for upkeep of waterways and marinas, renovation of piers and other infrastructure in the archipelago and to fishing guilds for managing the fish stock. Normally the grants are distributed yearly after organizations have applied for compensation.

The leases give money. After that, the general assembly decides on what to do. You can apply for contributions. [...] Yes, most often we try to steer the use of the dividends towards the archipelago. The Navigation club gets a contribution. They take care of marking the waterways. [...] Sometimes we have paid half the dredging of areas where there are a few second home owners so they have free waterway access to their second homes. They have to make an application to the general assembly. (Malax commons’ representative)

The third logic, protecting the **best interest of part-owners**, is central for all studied commons, however, less adopted as the main institutional goal. Sundom stands out as the only common, which pays dividends to individual part-owners as cash payment on a regular basis, proportional to their size of shares. Sundom archipelago is an attractive part of the area, not least among recreationists and second home owners. Within the common, there are approximately 460 second home leaseholds, which is slightly more than the other four commons own combined. Sundom also charges the highest prices for leaseholds, 420 € (in 2014–2015), to be compared with the range of 100–160 € in the other studied commons. Sundom commons have thus secured a large and steady stream of revenue. This
approach may be described as a ‘business-logic’ where the recreational value of the resource system is turned into personal profit for part-owners.

Our duty [as the part-owners’ representatives] is to make sure the part-owners interests in Sundom are taken into account, and to manage the part-owners property in Sundom in the best way. That is the foundation. (Sundom commons’ representative)

The management logics of the Kvarken Archipelago commons thus make them rather different local institutions, even though their organization and statutes are very similar. This difference rather lies in the interpretation of statutes and is grounded in the traditional view of property rights and community. The first and second logics are based on a more “social democratic” idea where the community’s (part-owners) goal is to maintain the use values of the resource system. The realized exchange values are returned for upkeep of the landscape, either the village as a whole, or more directly to the commons’ part-owners when directed to their use value of the archipelago. The resource system’s use value is in focus (logic 2) or is viewed as embedded in the wider community resources (logic 1). Meanwhile, the third logic represents a business-approach, which is similar to a holdings company where large shareholders make personal profit on the realized exchange values. According to this logic (logic 3), the resource system is viewed more from a production point of view (creating exchange value) than from a use value point of view, and community is understood as the part-owner community exclusively. The exchange value realization drawn from second home leases play a significant role in the interpretation of dividends logics. Whereas the revenue stream is large in Sundom commons, and the cash payments can be quite significant, this is not the case in the other studied commons:

You can say it’s impossible. The sums are so small, there’s not enough money to go around. It could be that someone gets 10 euros and some get 50 cent. It’s unnecessary. [...] There’s rather large costs for maintenance too. We have marinas that need maintenance and waterways that need dredging. (Malax commons’ representative)

Keeping the temptation of cash payment at a minimum can even be a strategy to ensure a more inclusive use of dividends, by keeping the prices of leaseholds low and focusing on continuous maintenance of the resource system:

If you keep the cash box at such a low level, try to spend money continuously so that you know that... [...] Then you can stress that we need a little margin, we want to do it for the community. (Molpe commons’ representative)

The distribution of power

The shares provide the basis of power distribution in the part-owner community. Most decisions are taken through voting procedures at the General Assembly (GA). In the matter of routine management issues, decisions are normally taken at a per capita vote. For issues of importance, for example election of executive committee, distribution of dividends or special leasehold agreements, voting is executed by a proportional register. The electoral register is scaled to the individual sizes of shares meaning that small-scale owners hold an inferior position. Whereas in some of the studied commons the distribution of shares is rather even, the situation is not the same in all. Sundom commons is an example of the latter, where uneven power distribution and the common’s revenue management logic have created a strong local elite.

Well, you vote according to your share in the common. You have a certain weight to your vote due to your share. So, there are really only a few people who steer the commons, because there are some with enormous amount of shares, and often they are the ones in the executive committee. (Second home owner and part-owner, Sundom)

This dominating group consists of individuals who own large forest parcels with tied shares adjacent to the village. Early institutional decisions laid down the present rules for voting, giving the larger shareholders an advantage in decision-making. Furthermore, as revenue refunds are scaled to share sizes, the interests of the local elite group in terms of changing the voting system as well as revenue management are vested.
Most often when they sell [property] they exclude shares in the commons and keep them to themselves. [...] Shares [in the commons] have become commodity. (Sundom common representative)

The superiority of large shareholders is further strengthened by a concentration of human and social capital comprising social resources needed to support development, such as networks, trust, reciprocity, exchanges, and levels of knowledge and skills among shareholders. In a broad sense, knowledge regarding the commons is poor among the public. The GA's are usually attended by a fraction of the part-owners, notably by those with a higher level of knowledge, and holding a larger part of shares. Older landowner generations are aware and informed about its history and meaning and their rights to the common-pool resource. Younger generations, if not landowners themselves, are quite unaware of this institution and the way the archipelago resource system is managed in Finland.

There are part-owners who understand this [how the commons' institution works]. It has been discussed to arrange some kind of seminars and to educate people. I think that would benefit everyone. (Sundom commons representative)

The management regime structure, for instance dividends logic, property rights, transfers and managerial procedures such as voting, is fairly unknown even within the part-owner community. This means that conflicts arise and sometimes become rather infected when part-owners feel they have been wronged or marginalized, and that likelihood of changes are unlikely as individuals do not understand how they could engage to bring changes about.

**Implications for the recreational landscape**

Altogether, in the studied commons, there are just over 860 second home plots on leasehold, normally sized 2,000 m\(^2\). The lease prices vary between the commons, ranging from 100 to 420 € per annum. The building itself is usually privately owned by the second home owner, whereas the leasehold plot is contracted. Principally, leases are only available for part-owners in the common, however some commons accept exemptions if no part-owners are willing to rent the plot. In Björkö non-members of the commons are allowed to lease a plot for a higher price than the part-owners. Thus, the commons' leasehold plots form pockets of exclusive property rights regimes in the popular and otherwise open access second home landscape of Kvarken Archipelago. Plots on common-pool property are ensured for the locals who have been resident in the area for many generations, effectively excluding “outsiders” and new inhabitants.

The leasehold contracts are designed as regulated in the statutes, and regulate the leaseholders’ rights to the property primarily in three ways: contract length, transfer rights and management of the plot. The length of leasehold contracts is normally 5 years, in seldom cases up to 30 years. The reason for adopting shorter contracts can be traced to the Law of the Commons (Finsk Författningssamling 1989, § 15) stating that renewing contracts longer than five years need a GA consent, which would make the process complicated. Normally, the renewal process is automatic given that the leaseholder is not guilty of serious neglect or disturbance.

However, the short time span of contracts is inconvenient for the second home owner as bank loans and building permissions are usually not permissible for such short contracts. This can have restrictive consequences when it comes to the upkeep of the property, especially in the case of larger renovation projects. In the case of transferring a leasehold contract to another person, the right to make decisions is entirely held by the commons. Transferring within the family through inheritance is normally not a difficult issue, given that the heir is a part-owner. When a second home is sold to a third party, the GA hold the right to approve the new leaseholder. As a general rule, the buyer must own shares in the commons to be eligible for transfer of leaseholder rights, and subsequently for purchasing the private second home.

We have our summer house here that we can rent to our friends if we can't find the time to get out there ourselves. We lease it but rent it out. But if we want to sell it to the people who have been using it for ten years, the commons can say that ‘these people cannot buy’. (Second home owner, Sundom)
In effect, this means that the second home owners, in principle, are not allowed to sell private property (the building itself) to anyone not approved by the GA, ensuring that leasehold plots are kept within the exclusive group of part-owners. For the second home owner, it could delimit the chances of selling the property to its ‘normal’ market value, as the number of potential buyers is decreased. In this way, the commons’ second home leaseholds rectify the commercialization of the second home landscape.

The leaseholders are obliged to maintain the second home property in good condition during their lease. Within most commons, the conduct of eliminating vegetation is free upon the leaseholders’ judgement; in others, the conduct is strictly controlled, and the leaseholder needs to ask permission even for rather small alterations. The same control conduct is due in dredging operations although this is anchored in legal matters. The decision of dredging is legally taken by the property owners, in these cases the commons. The reason for dredging as well as where to place the sediment have to be decided by the commons together with the leaseholders. The work leaseholders invest in developing the second home property are not necessarily reduced from the yearly leasing fee or refunded when selling the second home leasehold property. These rights and obligations of second home leaseholders have left some subtle, yet visible traces in the second home landscape. Second homes leaseholds tend to be simpler constructions due to the practical implications of short contract length and bureaucratic procedures prior to maintaining the plot. Leaseholds are also due to their ownership status guaranteed to stay as second homes, whereas it is now in Kvarken Archipelago, as in other attractive second home areas, rather popular to transform second homes into permanent year-round dwellings.

Conclusions

The commons in Kvarken Archipelago manage a growing natural resource system consisting of a former low value agricultural and fishing/hunting resource. This archipelago has transformed into a recreational landscape where second home living and leisure boating are important activities for locals and visitors alike. Through re-resourcing (Perkins 2006; Overvåg 2010) use values for recreationists and exchange value for the commons, who are able to draw revenue by leasing second home plots, are now realized from the resource system. This makes the Kvarken Archipelago a good example of a post-productive recreational landscape (Almstedt et al. 2014). The results also exemplify the complexity of natural resource systems, where values are mixed and different user groups draw from the resource units simultaneously (Rannikko & Salmi 2017): leisure and commercial fishing is underway while permanent dwellers, second home owners, tourists and even large transport ferries use the archipelago landscape on a daily basis. As demonstrated above, when a diverse number of actors and institutions are involved in land use, decision-making and management becomes complex (Markey et al. 2008). Therefore, the power relations and decision-making procedures within the commons become of interest in order to understand implications for recreation in the resource system.

The commons are, per definition, collective organizations where the part-owners jointly make decisions at the GA. However, each part-owner’s vote is scaled according to the sizes of shares in the commons, and the distribution of shares are tied to the old measure of mantal which in turn is tied to the old production values of the natural resources. With mantal as the basis, the large producers of exchange value hold the largest shares and thus the greatest decision-making powers in the commons. In this way, a large amount of shares does not necessarily equal a long-term use and interest in the water resources as such. However, with the changing value realization in the archipelago, the forest owners have also become managers of the water resource. The results of this study exemplify how an institutional path based in a historical setting creates conditions for resource management in the post-productive landscape. Originally, the management issue revolved around maintaining opportunities for meagre agriculture, fishing and hunting activities. Today, a differing view on which type of values should be maintained and differing views on the commons’ roles as local institutions are what have created the three logics of dividends distribution. The distribution logics are not exclusive, and more examples might be identified with further research of other commons.
With use values in focus, especially recreational use of the archipelago, combined with a view of the commons as managers of the resources and village association, logics 1 and 2 (best for the resource system and best for the village) are adopted and revenue is used for maintenance of the natural resources, upkeep of built infrastructure and village development. It is a rather inclusive view as it benefits many users, also ones who are not part-owners in the commons. When, on the other hand, exchange values become a focal point and the main concern is to see to the best of the exclusive part-owner community, the adopted logic may become more “business-oriented” and personal profit interests are secured besides maintenance of the resource base. This does not necessarily imply that personal profit is secured at the expense of maintenance or other activities. However, if the interests of a strong local elite becomes vested and the organization’s decision-making procedures are locked in its historical path, there is risk of personal gain and conflictual situations.

When it comes to implications for the recreational landscape, we draw the conclusion that the view upon recreation as either an open access or a commercial activity corresponds loosely to the different logics discussed above. However, as the resource system is mixed and contains multiple resource units and multiple types of users, it can also be claimed that both activities may occur simultaneously within the resource system. The common-pool resource, here the second home leasehold plots, is though a resource unit that in all studied commons is maintained more exclusively for the use of the commons' part-owner community. As such the second homes become, as stated above, “pockets” where exclusive use rights exist within the otherwise open access regime in the archipelago. Visibly, due to the collective decision-making procedures, the collectively owned second home leasehold plots tend to differ slightly from the general privately owned second home plots. Whereas the second home landscape in Kvarken Archipelago has undergone similar changes as in other attractive natural landscapes in Finland, such as upgraded modernized standard (electricity, hot water, water closets, winter insulation etc.) and transformation into permanent dwellings, the second home leaseholds tend to be less often renovated and maintained due to the short-term lease contracts and the need to ground plot maintenance with the GA.

While research on the commons is now a rigid body of literature, few studies have focused on common management of recreational resource systems. This paper has added to the literature by bringing together commons research and recreational resources with the rather modern phenomenon of second home living. The changes which have recently occurred in society combined with the long-term changes in the landscape have in turn changed the commons’ prerequisites to manage the resource. The recently recognized opportunity to create a steady inflow of revenue from recreational activities on emergent land has altered the commons’ raison d’être. The fact that the recreational resource is continuously growing further increases this opportunity. Therefore, a longer-term study would be useful to shed light on the process of adaptation.

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References


